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New Powers Imply New Responsibilities:
The Example of the Autonomous Car
Guillaume GUEGAN＊
“New powers imply new responsibilities”
The problem is topical and even central since we are witnessing a slow
evolution in the typology of road accidents. Indeed, there are several cases of
accidents related to a driving automation system.
In 2016, a first fatal accident involved a TESLA vehicle equipped with the
“Autopilot”1) system. The latter has focused the spotlight of the law on the potential
shortcomings of liability law in the face of these new technological players. In this
case, the vehicle struck a truck when neither the driver nor the system had detected
the truckʼs maneuvering or applied the brakes. The investigation conducted by the
National Safety and Transportation Council in the United States revealed that the
driver had not reacted, despite having received several alerts from the system. The
manufacturerʼs liability is therefore a priori excluded and de facto leaves the driver
alone to assume the obligations of vigilance and control of the vehicle. As a
reminder, the driver had to remain in control of his vehicle.
In 2018, in the United States, an accident involving a vehicle testing Uberʼs
services fatally hit a pedestrian pushing his bike across the road outside the
protected crossings in 2018, even though night had fallen. The investigation will
reveal that Uber had chosen to remove some sensors. However, determining the
origin of accidents remains fundamental to identifying responsibility, especially
since the Tempe Chief of Police, in charge of investigating the accident of the
vehicle, stated: “it would have been difficult to avoid this collision regardless of
the driving world, given the way the victim appeared on the road”. Perhaps the
solution to the trolley dilemma lies here2): «would you kill one person to save may
others?»
All these accidents, including those involving an autonomous shuttle, have
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1) “Autopilot” is defined by the manufacturer as an “improved autopilot” system - www.tesla.
com
2) https://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2016/dec/12/the-trolley-problem-would-
you-kill-one-person-to-save-many-others
contributed to the acceleration of international governmental actions to determine
the applicable liability regime and to supervise the deployment of “autonomous
vehicles”. Thus, the issue of transferring the responsibility for driving from the
driver to the manufacturers or manufacturers of the “intelligent” components of the
vehicle appears to be a major area of reflection3). It is of increasing interest to the
European authorities and to legal doctrine, which is already considering whether it
is appropriate to modify the legal regimes in force. But it is also a new issue for
insurers, who will have to be able to offer appropriate commercial offers.
I. A necessary evolution of global legal and insurance frameworks
A. A slow evolution of global legal regimes
In the United States, the first country to experiment with autonomous cars on
open roads in 2011, many states have legislation on autonomous vehicles. For
example, the State of Nevada requires a driver in the vehicle who is able to take
control of the vehicle at any time. In 2016, the State of Florida removed this
condition by allowing remote supervision and on the condition that a driver alert
system be integrated.
In Japan, The Prime Minister announced a public autonomous vehicle service
in Tokyo in 2020 for the Olympic Games. AND he says that those cars will also be
tested on Japanese roads before the end of this year.
Germany, for its part, has authorized the use of “autonomous vehicles” of
level 3 and 4 under certain conditions by a law that came into force in June 2017.
For example, it is provided that the delegation of the driving task may only be
authorized within the limits of the approved functions of a vehicle and that a driver
is always present in the vehicle in order to be able to regain control of it4).
In France, the legislator maintains the requirement of a natural person driver
but considers the possibility that he may be outside the car provided that he is able
to maintain control and supervision of the vehicle5). The future Pact law and the
next mobility orientation law should also go in the same direction and allow
French manufacturers to carry out experiments up to range level 5, which will
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3) The opinion of the Council of State on the draft Pact law (EC, opinion, 14 June 2018, n° 394.
599 and 395.021) as well as the resolution of the European Parliament of 15 January 2019 on
autonomous vehicles in European transport (2018/2089 (INI)).
4) www.buzer.de/gesetz/848/v206377-2017-06-21.htm
5) Experiments on autonomous vehicles in France are governed by the Energy Transition Act of
17 August 2015 (Law n° 2015-992), by the Ordinance of 3 August 2016 (Ordinance n° 2016-
1057) and by the decrees of 28 March 2018 (n° 2018-211).
eventually allow the commercial deployment of “autonomous vehicles”.
Despite these legal developments, in France but more generally in most
European countries, the introduction on the market of “autonomous vehicles”
requires compliance with technical standards allowing the approval of vehicles, as
well as legal standards, first and foremost the Vienna Convention of 8 November
19686), which prevails over the provisions of national law7).
Today, the Vienna Convention requires the presence of a driver who is
proficient in driving his vehicle. While the last amendment to the Vienna
Convention, which entered into force on 23 March 2016, introduced a paragraph
5bis into Article 8 (5), which allows all on-board systems affecting driving, the
latter has important limitations.
Indeed, the amendment to the Vienna Convention did not change the notion of
“driver” or the requirement for “control” of the vehicle by the latter. Thus, the
technologies of driving delegation integrated into the vehicle are compatible with
the said Convention only if a natural person is able to take over the vehicle at any
time. In the absence of a definition of the notion of control or control of the
vehicle, it is possible to consider that a driving system can control the environment
alone, the human being only having the obligation to control the system.
International discussions show in this respect that more or less long-term
developments are necessary to remove the requirement for a natural person driver.
An evolution if not necessary, inevitable only the law, by its adaptability, is able to
grasp. Starting with the apprehension of the particularism of autonomous vehicles
by insurance law.
B. The central role of insurance companies
Since the law of 27 February 19588), France has introduced compulsory
insurance to protect the owner of a vehicle against accidents involving it. This
insurance, known in France as “third party insurance”, has since been made
compulsory throughout Europe by Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972.
In this respect, Article L. 211-1 of the Insurance Code generally requires
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increase safety on the roads through the adoption of uniform rules for circuclations”
(preamble).
7) If the highway code does not comply with the Vienna Convention and, in particular, if it
contains provisions contrary to the Convention, then the Convention prevails over the
provisions of the Highway Code.
8) Law n° 58-208.
compulsory insurance for persons wishing to operate a land motor vehicle.
Article L. 211-1: “Any natural person or any legal person other than the
State, whose civil liability may be incurred for damage suffered by third
parties resulting from damage to persons or property in the performance of
which a vehicle is involved, must, in order to make it run, be covered by
insurance guaranteeing such liability, under the conditions set by decree in
the Council of State”.
Insurance is therefore compulsory for any machine qualified as a land motor
vehicle, the definition of which is given by Articles L. 211-1 of the Insurance Code
but also by Article L. 110-1 of the Highway Traffic Act, which respectively define
a land motor vehicle as “any motor vehicle intended to travel on the ground and
which can be powered by mechanical force without being connected to a railway
track, as well as any trailer, even if not coupled” or as “any land vehicle equipped
with a propulsion engine, including trolleybuses, and running on the road by its
own means, with the exception of vehicles travelling on rails”.
Thus, all vehicles that can be qualified as “autonomous” or “semi-
autonomous” are covered by the provisions relating to compulsory insurance since
they meet the stated criteria. This concept of compulsory insurance, which is
relatively broad, therefore makes it possible to bring the user of an autonomous
vehicle within the scope of the guarantee without imposing any particular criteria
relating to the quality of “driver”. However, there is still uncertainty as to the
qualification of these new technological players with regard, in particular, to the
legal requirements laid down by the Highway Code.
Insurance companies are therefore strongly interested and already impacted by
the advent of autonomous vehicles since their insurance contracts will have to be
modified or even redesigned, mainly because of the change in risk. In addition, the
introduction of new risks will most certainly revolutionize the scope of optional
cover, since the European Commission, analyzing the directives requiring insurance
against motor vehicle risk, considered that “autonomous cars” fall within the scope
of French and even international texts.
Moreover, the mandatory provisions relating to the purchase of “third party”
insurance do not, under French law, prevent the purchase of optional cover that
could be reinvented in view of the specific features of the “autonomous vehicle”.
II. Who is responsible for compensating victims?
As with the issue of data collection and processing, the question of who is
responsible for compensating victims is certainly one of the major legal challenges
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of the 21st century, since this question aims to determine the impact of the
introduction of “autonomous” vehicles on the regulation of compensation for road
accident victims.
At the dawn of the actual circulation of autonomous vehicles, three questions
arise in reality: that of determining the status of the victim (e. g. driver or non-
driver), that of the final debtor of compensation as soon as the driver receives
driving assistance, but also that of determining whether a contribution recourse by
the “payer” insurer, called solvens, is possible.
A. Compensation of victims by the Badinter law of 5 July 1985
Compensation for victims of a traffic accident involving an “autonomous”
vehicle requires a distinction according to the quality of the victim. Indeed, the
Badinter law distinguishes between whether the victim is a driver or not.
Article 1 of the Badinter Act of 5 July 1985 stipulates that: “The provisions
(...) shall apply, even when carried under contract, to the victims of a road traffic
accident involving a motor vehicle and its trailers or semi-trailers, with the
exception of railways and tramways operating on their own tracks”.
3 cumulative conditions are therefore considered and necessary for the
provisions of the Badinter law to be applicable.
In view of the tragic events that took place in 2016 and 2018 in the United
States, there is little doubt that the “autonomous vehicle” can be considered as a
land motor vehicle capable of being involved in a traffic accident. Moreover, if we
look closely at it, the primary interest of the Badinter Act concerning compensation
for victims lies in the burden of proof. Indeed, in view of the technical nature of
“autonomous vehicles”, this point is essential in the societal acceptability of this
new technology.
Consistently in French law, the case law specifies that the civil liability of the
author of a damage is established only if a causal link between the fault and the
damage is reported9). However, under French common law, the burden of proof of
causation lies with the victim10). On the basis of this premise, the question of proof
of causation appears to be a definite obstacle to the compensation of victims in the
event of a traffic accident involving an autonomous vehicle. Indeed, how to
establish the causal link of a vehicle using artificial intelligence? The technicality
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and expertise necessary to decipher the vehicleʼs behavior necessary to establish a
causal link is only within the reach of an expert.
Thus, by removing any link to causality, the Badinter Act made it possible to
speed up procedures for compensating victims by basing it on proof of the
vehicleʼs involvement. This is why the insurance obligation allows the
compensation of victims to be covered not by the driver and/or guardian of the
vehicle involved, but by his insurer.
In theory, we should not have to wonder about the causal or not, active or
passive role of a vehicle involved in a traffic accident. This is why the French
legislator has used the notion of vehicle involvement. In this way, it has freed itself
from the notion of causality traditionally associated with the establishment of the
civil liability of the author of a damage. Moreover, French case law has repeatedly
excluded the requirement of an active fact of the vehicle in the occurrence of the
damage11). Therefore, in accordance with the Badinter Act, it is not necessary to
search for the person responsible for the accident, but for the solvens, i.e. the
person who will be held liable for compensation to the victim, in other words, the
insurer. It is the responsibility of the latter to act in liability against the real
perpetrator of the accident. However, assuming the advent of SAE 4 or even 5
level cars, the problem induced by the use of artificial intelligence will be identical
to the one mentioned above: how could solvens establish the causal link?
The originality of the notion of involvement therefore lies in the fact that, in
the case of a road accident, proof of fault is not required, or the exclusion of a
disruptive role that involves fault, but the intervention of the vehicle in any
capacity whatsoever in the occurrence of the damage. This is why, in the absence
of contact between the vehicles, the mere presence of the vehicle is not sufficient
to characterize the involvement12). However, while evidence of disruptive behavior
does not have to be reported, the Court of Cassation has reiterated a now constant
position that the victim must provide evidence of the role of the vehicle in the
accident, and refers the analysis of the evidence submitted to it to the sovereign
assessment of the trial judges13).
The notion of involvement is therefore very favorable to victims. It is defined
independently of any fault and thus constitutes an original provision and is
compatible with the introduction of “autonomous” vehicles. It makes it possible to
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11) Cass. 2nd civ., 4 December 1985, n° 84-13.226; Cass. 2nd civ., 23 March 1994, n° 92-12.253.
12) Cass. 2nd civ., 2 March 2017, n° 16-15.562.
13) Cass. 2nd civ., 26 October 2017, n° 16-22.462.
lighten the burden of proof but also to consider that the introduction of
“autonomous vehicles” would not be binding from the point of view of
compensation. In this way, these legislative provisions contribute to the
acceptability of this new technology.
While French law has been applying this system for more than 30 years and
can, at first sight, serenely apprehend the introduction of “autonomous vehicles”,
the situation is quite different in many countries. Abroad, the question of the
person responsible for compensation is a question for many legislators, particularly
in Germany and England.
Victims may be forced to report the driverʼs fault in order to be entitled to
compensation. Some laws have therefore been amended to take into account the
particularities generated by the traffic of vehicles for which the driverʼs driving
task has been transferred to the system.
In this respect, German law, in June 2017, authorized the use of “autonomous
vehicles” of levels 3 and 5 under certain well-defined conditions: on the one hand,
the delegation of the driving task is authorized only within the limits of the
approved functions of a vehicle and, on the other hand, there must always be a
driver, which requires the latter to take back control if the vehicle requests it. In
the United Kingdom, the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act of 2018 requires the
vehicle insurer to compensate victims of an accident involving an “autonomous
vehicle”. However, this law very restrictively defines the vehicle covered by these
provisions. Indeed, it concerns the vehicle that is not controlled by any human and
does not need to be monitored, i.e. a vehicle of minimum level 4. In France, the
legislator seems to have taken note of the favorable provisions of the Badinter Act
because the draft Covenant Act does not, for the time being, call into question the
principle of compensation for victims.
It should be noted that the Badinter law does not define the notion of
“accident”. According to the Larousse French dictionary, an accident is defined as
a “fortuitous event that has more or less damaging effects on people or things.
However, there will only be a traffic accident when it occurs in a place of traffic,
private or public, even if the vehicle is parked14).
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B. Assumption that the conditions of the Badinter Act do not apply
1. Compensation of victims by the common law of liability for damage caused by
events
Where the conditions of the Badinter Act are not met, the victim is not
prohibited from bringing an action for compensation on the basis of ordinary law
with the motor insurer of the vehicle involved.
Indeed, if the damage originates from something, as is the case for a vehicle,
the victim can claim compensation for his or her damage on the basis of liability
for things. This liability regime is a case law creation resulting from the Jandʼheur
judgment of the United Chambers of the Court of Cassation of 13 February 1930.
However, the implementation of this regime requires three conditions to be
met: one thing, one thing, one thing and one guardian of the thing. Thus, in
principle, anything such as an “autonomous vehicle” is likely to be considered as
the cause of damage. The burden of proof of the role of the thing in the realization
of the damage will be on the victim. It should be noted with regard to the burden
of proof that the Jandʼheur decision raised a presumption of causation when things
are in motion. On the other hand, when the thing is inert, the victim will have to
provide proof of the abnormality of the thing.
It should be noted that liability for acts of God is an objective liability, i.e. the
guardian cannot exonerate himself from his liability by proving that there is no
fault. On the other hand, he may be exonerated from any liability if he
demonstrates force majeure, or possibly for a partial exemption, the fact of the
victim15).
The determination of the guardian of the thing and therefore of the car is a
much more sensitive issue. It presupposes that the traditional conception of the
guard is understood in advance in view of the possible problems that could arise
from the deployment of “autonomous vehicles”.
Custody is defined through the notions of use, control and direction over the
thing. Thus, the person who had the material possession of the object at the time of
the damage and who exercised some control over it is considered to be the
guardian. The owner of a vehicle can therefore exonerate himself, in theory, from
his liability when he proves that he did not exercise the powers of use, direction
and control characterizing the custody on the car, without having to determine to
whom the custody was transferred.
However, as far as the user of an “autonomous vehicle” is concerned, it seems
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more delicate to attribute de facto the status of guardian to him/her. Indeed, let us
take the example where the vehicle is in motion, the guard will then in principle be
the driver who can however be a different person from the owner of the vehicle, in
particular in the event of a loan or theft. In this hypothesis, the Court of Cassation
seems to refer to the classic notion of guardian, retaining that the person behind the
wheel of a towed vehicle retains the status of driver and therefore ultimately
guardian because he retains a certain “control” of the vehicle16). This leads us to
believe that the recognition of the responsibility of the car user will always be
engaged, even in the case of a level 3 driving aid. However, it will be different if
the user has the possibility to take control of the vehicle, which will most probably
be the case even for vehicles with a range of 4 and 5.
Consequently, the situation described above allows the “autonomous vehicles”
to be put into service without much difficulty, at least in terms of determining the
person responsible. On the other hand, in the event that the vehicle is equipped
with a full driving delegation, i.e. when its user does not have the ability to “take
control” of the vehicle once the assistance has been activated, it would seem very
difficult, legally, to recognize the latter as a guardian. Common sense governs this
analysis. So what solution?
Perhaps it would then be legally appropriate to apply, with regard to
“autonomous vehicles”, a dormant theory since a decision of the Court of
Cassation of 5 October 2006 and to the introduction of a specific regime of liability
for defective products, namely the distinction between the custody of the structure
and the custody of the behavior.
As a matter of principle, since the Franck judgment of 2 December 1941,
custody is alternative since two persons cannot, in principle, exercise custody of a
thing at the same time.
Thus, in the absence of a definition of a “certain control” of the “autonomous
vehicle”, as understood by the judges to recognize the responsibility of drivers, it
would be appropriate to consider a sharing between the guardian of the vehicle
structure (the manufacturer) and the guardian of the vehicleʼs behavior (the vehicle
user). In terms of driving an autonomous vehicle, some authors have distinguished
between material and intellectual direction17). Indeed, it could very easily be
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assumed that in the presence of a vehicle equipped with a driving delegation
system, the latter being in reality under the physical “control” of the machine. Man
would then be de facto excluded from the decision-making equation.
According to this old theory, it would then remain to differentiate the person
responsible according to the nature of the assistance provided. Two possibilities.
First, the assumption that the user can only give intellectual instructions and
that the car alone would decide what maneuvers to perform (SAE levels 4 and 5).
In this case, the guardian of the structure (which will be determined to the extent
that it would be possible to consider engaging the liability of the vehicle
manufacturer or software developer etc.) will be liable for damage caused by the
defect in the vehicle. On the other hand, the user, holder of the intellectual control
of the vehicle, i.e. the guardian of the behavior, will only be liable in the event that
the use of the vehicle, not defective, would be at the origin of the accident.
Secondly, and conversely, the assumption that the user is able to regain
control of the vehicle at any time. In this specific case, which seems to concern a
vehicle with a level 3 range, the user will retain the status of guardian of the
machine and will therefore be solely liable towards the victims.
In conclusion, this dichotomy would be essential only in the context of the
search for a responsible person based on the common law system of liability for
things. In practice, however, this regime should only be exercised at the margin
and mainly when the conditions of the Badinter Act are not met. Indeed, if victims
can obtain compensation on the basis of the Badinter Act, then the notion of
guardian and driver is totally indifferent as to the determination of compensation.
The responsibility will therefore inevitably follow this logic in a cascade and
it will not necessarily be the responsibility of the designer.
2. Compensation for the driver who is the victim of a car defect
When a vehicle is the only one involved in a traffic accident, the Badinter law
does not apply to the driver18). Similarly, “the guardian of a land motor vehicle
who is the victim of a traffic accident may not avail himself of the provisions of
the law of 5 July 1985 against his own insurer to obtain compensation for his
damage, in the absence of a third party driver of the vehicle who is liable for
compensation in respect of him”19).
On the other hand, no text excludes the application of common law regimes,
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in particular if the accident is caused by a technical and/or mechanical failure.
Consequently, in the event that the driver is held liable, but to a greater extent in
the event that the Badinter law cannot be applied, the law allows compensation for
damage resulting from a failure of the car, either on the basis of hidden defects or
on the basis of defective products.
i. Compensation of the driver on the basis of hidden defects
Under French law, the application of the hidden defect regime does not raise
any particular problems in anticipation of the arrival of autonomous vehicles.
Indeed, the legal regime of compensation based on the hidden defect of things
benefits every buyer and stipulates in articles 1641 to 1649 of the Civil Code that
every seller is bound by a mandatory guarantee towards the buyer.
Article 1641 of the Civil Code: “The seller is bound by the warranty on
account of hidden defects in the thing sold which make it unfit for the use for
which it is intended, or which reduce this use to such an extent that the buyer
would not have acquired it, or would have given only a lower price, if he had
known them”.
This guarantee requires the seller to deliver goods that are free of defects and
suitable for the use for which they are intended. Failing this, the seller must insure
with the buyer the responsibility for defects or hidden defects affecting the property
sold. This warranty applies to all buyers (professional or not) and all goods (new or
second-hand).
Concerning the application to “autonomous” vehicles, this guarantee is subject
to the fulfilment of four conditions laid down by law:
- A “hidden” defect affecting the car;
- A defect “prior” to the sale;
- The action in guarantee of hidden defects must be brought within 2 years
from the discovery of the defect;
- The defect affecting the car must be serious or prohibitive, to such an extent
that the buyer would not have bought it or would have offered a lower price
if he had known about it, or that the defect in question makes the thing sold
unfit for the use for which it is intended.
However, these provisions do not suffer from any particular interpretation or
problem with regard to the upcoming arrival of autonomous vehicles on our roads,
unlike the guarantee relating to defective products.
ii. The legal regime for compensation based on the defect of the “autonomous car
The legal regime for compensating victims of damage caused by a defective
product is the subject of specific regulations, incorporated into the Civil Code by a
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law of 19 May 199820). It determines not only the person responsible, but also the
duration of responsibility.
Under article 1245 of the Civil Code, the producer is liable for damage caused
by a defect in his product: “The producer is liable for damage caused by a defect
in his product, whether or not he is bound by a contract with the victim”.
As such, it is considered as a producer “any person who participates in the
manufacture of the product that proves defective. That is, the application of the
special liability regime extends to assimilated producers, i.e. persons who are
involved in the production chain, presenting themselves in the eyes of consumers
as a producer. This assimilation is the result of an extension provided for by the
1985 Directive21), which was designed to facilitate the assumption of responsibility
by large retailers.
In order to be able to hold the car manufacturer liable, the victim must
therefore provide proof of a defect in the autonomous car within the prescribed
time limits. As such, the limitation period applicable to civil liability actions is set
by article 2224 of the Civil Code and is 5 years.
Article 2224 of the Civil Code: “Personal or movable actions are time-
barred after five years from the day on which the holder of a right has known
or should have known the facts enabling him to exercise it”.
However, the limitation period for the victimʼs action is limited to a period of
foreclosure, i.e. a period beyond which it will become impossible for the victim to
bring an action. Article 1245-15 of the Civil Code provides that the producer may
no longer be held liable beyond a period of 10 years following the release of the
product, unless proof of a fault on the part of the manufacturer, within the meaning
of article 1240 of the Civil Code, is provided, it being specified that it is accepted
by the Court of Cassation that the fault cannot result solely from the marketing of a
defective product.
Article 1245-15 of the Civil Code: “Unless the producer is at fault, his
liability, based on the provisions of this chapter, shall be extinguished ten
years after the very product that caused the damage was put into circulation
unless, during that period, the victim has taken legal action”.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code: “Any act of man, which causes damage
to another person, obliges the person through whose fault he has come to
make reparation for it”.
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21) Directive 85/374/CEE.
If the requirement of proof of the entry into service of a defective product,
envisaged in article 1245-2 of the Civil Code, does not suffer from any particular
remark with regard to the advent of autonomous vehicles, it is quite different with
regard to the need to prove a lack of safety of the product.
Article 1245-2 of the Civil Code: “Any movable property, even if it is
incorporated in a building, including products of the soil, livestock, hunting
and fishing, is a product”.
The legislator has taken care to exclude the notion of obsolescence from the
definition of a security defect. Indeed, article 1245-3 paragraph 3 of the Civil Code
provides that the defect of a product cannot result from the “mere fact that another,
more sophisticated product has subsequently been put into circulation”. However,
this limit alone is not sufficient to limit the safety defect necessary for liability for
defective products. Therefore, it is appropriate to refer to the purpose of articles
1245 and followings of the Civil Code to exclude concepts that do not define a
safety defect. It should be noted that this regime has the particularity of applying
indiscriminately depending on whether or not the victim is bound by contract to the
responsible producer22).
As such, any defect appearing to be due to a lack of conformity of the
product23), a hidden defect24) or a “dangerous” product will be excluded from the
liability regime25).
In any event, by default, the French judges will make an assessment in
abstracto, by reference to the legislative standard of “safety to which one can
legitimately expect” and to which the judge must refer, taking into account “all the
circumstances and in particular the presentation of the product”26) and the use that
can reasonably be expected of it as well as the time of release.
Thus, two remarks are in order with regard to the near future of autonomous
vehicles. First, where the design domain has limits of use, SAE levels 3 and 4, it
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22) Article 1245 of the Civil Code: “The producer is liable for damage caused by a defect in his
product, whether or not he is bound by a contract with the victim”.
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possession of the buyer.”
24) Articles 1641 to 1649 of the Civil Code.
25) European Directive 2001/95/EC, relating to the general safety of products and Article L. 221-
1 of the Consumer Code: “Products and services must, under normal conditions of use or
under other conditions reasonably foreseeable by the trader, offer the safety that can
legitimately be expected and not harm the health of persons”.
26) Cass. 1st. civ., 22 November 2007, n° 06-14.174.
would be possible to consider the use of the liability regime for defective products
not only in the event of mechanical and/or technical failure, but also in the event of
functional limitations or even reasonably foreseeable misuse that is not brought to
the attention of the user. This increases the manufacturerʼs obligation and imposes
not only appropriate information on the user, but also proof of it.
For this reason, the presence and rigor of the operating instructions will be of
utmost importance. This is why one of the manufacturersʼ concerns today is to
demonstrate the safety of the “autonomous vehicle”. The insecurity presented could
thus justify the regulatory introduction of a safety demonstration dossier by
regulating various modalities related to the particularism of “autonomous vehicles”.
Among the solutions considered, the “Safety of the intended Functionality” could
set a minimum level of safety by guaranteeing the safe behavior of the
“autonomous vehicle” under operating conditions integrating operating limits and
“foreseeable” misuse.
The stakes are high and discussions are ongoing within the European
institutions without it being possible at this time to determine the future of this
issue and the legal solution chosen.
Secondly, despite the presence of certain legal grounds for exonerating
producers from liability, it is up to the victim who invokes the defect of the
product to prove it27). However, the proof of the defect of a product and the causal
link between this defect and the damage does not follow from the simple
imputability of the damage to the product in question28).
Therefore, if the defect of the autonomous car is not demonstrated, neither is
the causal link between this defect and the damage. In other words, in the event of
an accident involving an autonomous car, it is up to the victim to prove the defect
of the latter vehicle. However, given the technical nature of such a car, it also
seems very difficult for any user to determine and establish proof of this defect but
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27) Article 1245-10 of the Civil Code: “The producer is liable for damage caused by a defect in
his product, whether or not he is bound by a contract with the victim”.
28) Cass. 1st civ., 27 June 2018, n° 17-17.469. “In this case, if it is certain that the product is
involved in the occurrence of the damage, its defect has not been demonstrated. It is therefore
not obvious that the product has a defect. Without this proof, the producer cannot be held
liable. Consequently, if the defect of the product is not demonstrated, a fortiori, the causal
link between that defect and the damage is not either. By holding the producer liable, despite
the doubt as to the origin of the damage, the trial judges violated Article 1245-3 of the Civil
Code. The response of the Court of Cassation is not surprising. It has, however, the merit of
underlining its commitment to a literal application of the text and not to deduce evidence
from other evidence”.
also to determine who is responsible for it from the manufacturer, the software
developer, etc....
Thus, if it would be possible to think of reversing the burden of proof in order
to require the manufacturer to prove in particular that the vehicle is free of fault
and/or defect, this solution would have the disadvantage of making the law a real
brake on innovation.
In view of this observation and the delicate balance to be struck between the
technological and economic interests of manufacturers on the one hand and the legal
and compensatory interests of victims of accidents involving an autonomous vehicle
on the other, it would seem that the problem could be reduced to an insurance issue
and the identification of new risks. However, such a solution would be incomplete
because it would not take into account one parameter: important: ethics.
3. The autonomous car must be “by design”
The various remedies envisaged above highlight the existence of a legal
framework compatible with the deployment of autonomous vehicles. The solvens
who have compensated the victim, or the sole driver involved in an accident and
without compensation, can thus exercise a recourse with the person responsible, the
one who caused the accident. Such actions allow either the repair of the vehicle or
compensation for personal injury. Nevertheless, the burden of proof remains on the
applicant, which could argue in favor of, inter alia, vehicle data recording devices.
However, the problem would be equally incomplete because only an expert could
read the thousands of lines of code or the software designer as such. While
knowing that it is utopian from an economic and innovation point of view to
reverse the burden of proof, such a solution would therefore not facilitate the
burden of proof in any way.
The notion of ethics then seems to be decisive both from the point of view of
the processing and collection induced by the operation of autonomous vehicles and
from the point of view of the problem of liability in the event of an accident.
Indeed, starting from the concept of ethics, it would be possible to establish
new criteria that would determine the development of a new insurance system but
also promote the acceptability of this new technology used by autonomous
vehicles: artificial intelligence. It seems that the debate that crystallizes the debates
resides in the dilemma of the tramway, which could be summarized as the choice
that a car could make in various situations involving values and ethical choices. It
would therefore be like having a “moral” Artificial Intelligence, i.e. an artificial
intelligence that would make decisions that would have an impact on peopleʼs
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lives. To rule on such questions would therefore be to give manufacturers the
opportunity to distribute this risk. This option cannot be considered because
ethically, this solution would be extremely questionable.
The problem of determining liability in the event of an accident with the
arrival of autonomous cars is therefore a definite societal advance but represents a
real social concern.
Ultimately, the quality of the data is therefore important in decision-making in
the autonomous car because by its treatment it will be possible to influence the
acceptability of autonomous cars but more generally on Artificial Intelligence. This
is why the AI of tomorrow must be trustworthy and for that it must meet three
criteria:
- Explicability: Artificial intelligence must be able to explain, i.e. make things
intelligible and contextualized so that Man is able to make a decision.
- Validity: having an AI in conformity with its specifications, i.e. able to
prove that the system will do what is expected of it.
- Responsibility: this means that a system must comply with the legal
frameworks (by design), i.e. by default during design.
A “by design” conception is thus a first response to the problem induced by
the development of intelligence in our everyday objects such as a car. There is no
doubt that this solution will be refined over time. However, it has the merit, today,
of not reversing the burden of proof. By this conception, it seems that the balance
between the interests of industrialists and those of victims is initially found.
Conclusion
Science and technology have a strong impact on society and the autonomous
car is a perfect example. Applications will be very difficult to predict. A reflection,
particularly a legal one, must therefore be carried out beforehand.
Indeed, intelligent transport and artificial intelligence can transform jobs,
eliminate them, but above all they will meet essential challenges in terms of
mobility, urban planning, the environment, the economy...
Framing the development of tomorrowʼs intelligent transport and, more
generally, robotics and artificial intelligence in an ethical approach is therefore
essential in order to determine the applicable liability regime.
The law must be seen as an accelerator of innovation and not as a brake.
The use of robots, autonomous cars and artificial intelligence will lead to new
legislation (Example: legislation on drones) which will have to be flexible in order
to take into account the rapid evolution of new technologies and its new problems.
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